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[L. A. No. 21390. In Bank

Atl~.

10, 1951.J

RALPH CLINTON BOREN. Appellant. v. STATE PERSONNEL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA et a1., Respondents.
[1] Civil Service - Dismissal- Judicial Remedies. - An ordinary
civil action is inappropriate to annul an order of the State Personnel Board dismissing plaintiff from his civil service position
and to recover salary accruing from the date of dismissal.
[2] Administrative Law-Court Review of Administrative Action
-Remedies.-Since the enactment of Code Civ. Proc., §1094.5,
the writ of mandamus is appropriate for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order or
decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by law
a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to be
taken and discretion in the determination of facts is invested
in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board ot officer.
[3] Civil Service - Dismissal - Judicial Remedies - Mandamus.
-Proceedings before the State Personnel Board in connection
with the dismissal of a civil service employee are of the type
envisioned by Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5, and mandamus will
lie to review t.he board's decision. (See Gov. Code, § 19570 et
seq.)

[4] ld.-Dismissal.,.-Judicial Remedies-Certiorari.-Since the jurisdiction of the State Personnel Board, including its ad,iudicatmg power, is derived directly from the Constitution (art.
XXIV, § 3a), certiorari is available to review the board's
decision dismissing an employee from his civil service position.
(See Code Civ. Proe., §§ 1068,1074.)
[5] ld.-Dismissal-Judicial Remedies-Pleading.-Against a general demurrer, it is unimportant that plaintiff's pleading to
annul an order of the State Personnel Board dismissing him
and t.o recover salary accruing from the date of dismissal is
not in the form of a petition for mandamus or certiorari, if a
cause of action for mandamus or certiorari "as been stated.
(Code Civ. Proc., §§ 452,580,1109.)
[lJ See 5 Cal.Jur. 143; 10 Am.Jur. 935.
McK. Dig. References: [1,3-5,10,12, 21-23J Civil Service, § 13;
[2J Administrative Law, § 19; [6,9, 15J Civil Service, § 9; [7] State
of California. §51; [8, 11J Civil Service, §12; [13J Pleading,
§ 84; [14] Contracts, § 263; [16,17] Civil Service, ~ 1; [18] Civil
Service, § 7.1; [19] Estoppel, § 44; [20J Agency, § 63.
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16) Id.-Dismissal-Jurisdiction of Board. _. In view of Con st.,

)

art. XXIV, §§ 2tc), 3(a), 5(a), the dismissal of an employee
from his civil service position is within the jurisdiction of the
State Personnel Board. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(b) i see, also,
Gov. Code, § 1957(' et seq.)
[7] State of California-Contracts.-The very nature of a contract
with the state makes impossible an interpretation or enforcement of it that is in the strictest sense "disinterested"; some
officer, agency, or court of the state itself must ultimately
decide what are the state's rights and obligations; protection
to those who deal with the state is provided, not by referring
controversies to third parties, but by electing and appointini
conscientious officials and judges.
[8] Civil Service-Dismissal-Hearing.-There is no unfairness in
the fact that a civil service employee's rights of tenure have
been decided in the first instance at u hearing before the same
public agency with which he dealt at the time of his appointment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(b).)
[9] Id.-Dismissal-Autbority of Board.-State employment is accepted subject to statutory provisions regulating such matters
as salary, working conditions, and tenure, and a civil service
employee is presumed to know when he joins the service that
the State Personnel Board is charged by law with deciding all
questions of dismissal. (Const., arLXXIV; Gov. Code, § 19570
et1seq.)
[10] Id.-Dismissal-Judicial Remedies-Pleading.-In an action
to annul an order of the State Personnel Board dismissing
plaintiff from his civil service position and to recover salary
accruing from the date of dismissal, plaintiff failed to allege
facts that establish a denial of a fair trial, where he made no
claim that any member of the State Personnel Board was
prejudiced against him, and the board was a proper tribunal.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5(b).)
[11] Id.-Dismissal-Hearing.-Under certain conditions, the failure of the State Personnel Board to consider a proper defense
set up by the party charged or to make findings thereon might
constitute a failure to proceed "in the manner required by law"
and therefore an abuse of discretion under Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1094.5. (See Gov. Code, §§ 19578, 19582.)
[12a. 12b] Id.-Dismissal-Judicial Remedies-Pleading.-In an
action to annul an order of the State Personnel Board dismissing plaintiff from his civil service position, no abuse of discretion (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) is indicated by an allegatiun
that the board ignored plaintiff's defense that his contract of
employment limited his services to Southern California and

[6J See 5 Cal.Jur.148j 10 Am.Jur. 931.
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that he was justified in refusing to report for duty at Sacramento, where, in view of Gov. Code, § 19360, giving the power
of transfer to his superior, had such findings been made they
would not support the conclusion tha,t his employment was
conditional and his refusal justified.
[13] Pleading-Demurrer as Ad:nission.-A demurrer assumes the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
[14] Contraets-Pleading.-A contract may ordinarily be pleaded
by its legal e1Iect.
[15] Civil Service-Dismissal-Authority of Board.-Since the authority of the State Personnel Board is go\'erned by the
Constitution and by the Civil Service Act (Gov. Code, § 18500
et seq.), both of which are the subject of judicial notice (Code
Civ. Proe., § 1875 (2), (3), the scope of that authority is a
question of law and may properly be considered on demurrer.
[16J Id.-Statutory Regulation.-The terms and conditions of civil
service employment are fixed by statute and not by contract.
[17] Id.-Statutory Regulation.-The statutory provisions controlling the terms and conditions of civil {ervice employment
cannot be circumvented by purported contracts in conflict
therewith.
[18] Id.-Transfers.-No geographical limitation is placed on the
broad power granted by Gov. Code, J 19360, to transfer a civil
service employee from one job in the state to another. (See,
also, Gov. Code, §§ 18006, 19361.)
(19] Estoppel-Against Public.-The authority of a public officer
cannot be expanded by estoppel.
[20J Agency-Ostensible Authority-Basis of Doctrine.-The doetrines of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel are not based
on the representations of the agent but on the representations
of the principal.
[21] Civil Service -Dismissal- Judicial Remedies - Pleading.Where the complaint in an action to annul an order of the State
Personnel Board dismissing plaintiff from his civil service position states that the board made findings, without setting them
forth even in substance, it must be assumed, in the absence of
a contrary allegation, that the board's decision is supported
by the findings and that the findings are supported by the
evidence.
(22] Id. - Dismissal- Judicial Remedies - Mandamus. - Where
plaintiff, in an action to annul an order of the State Personnel
Board dismissing him from his civil service position, fails to
bring his allegations within the provisions of Code Civ. Proe.,
§ 1094.5, be fails to state a cause of action for relief by writ
of mandamus.
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[23) Id.-Dismissal- Judicial Remedies - Certiorari.-Sinee the
scope of review by certiorari is at least as limited as that by
mandamus, plaintifi who fails to state a cause of action ill
mandamus to annul an order of the State Personnel Board
dismissing him from his civil service position likewise fails to
state a cause of action in certiorari. (Code Civ. Proe., § 1074.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. William B. McKesson, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to annul order of State Personnel Board dismissing
employee from civil service position. Judgment of dismissal
on sustaining demurrer to second amended complaint without leave to amend, affirmed.
George E. Cryer and R. Alston Jones for Appellant.
Fred N. Howser and Edmund G. Brown, Attorneys General, Howard C. Goldin and Bayard Rhone, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J .-This appeal is on the judgment roll from
a judgment of dismissal entered on an order sustaining a
demjurrer to plaintiff's second amended complaint without
leave to amend.
[1] The complaint in form is simply a complaint in a
civil action. Plaintiff seeks to annul an order of defendant
State Personnel Board dismissing him from his civil service
position and also seeks a judgment awarding him the salary
accruing thereto from the date of his suspension. For this
relief, an ordinary civil action is inappropriate. (See Tenth
Biennial Report of the Judicial Council of California, 133-145.)
[2] Since the enactment of section 1094.5 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, it is no longer open to question that in this
state the writ of mandamus is appropriate "for the purpose
of inquiring into the validity of any final administrative order
or decision made as the result of a proceeding in which by
law a hearing is required to be given, evidence is required to
be taken and discretion in the determination of facts is vested
in the inferior tribunal, corporation, board or officer. . . . "
[3] The proceedings of the State Personnel Board in connection with plaintiff's dismissal were clearly of the type
envisioned by section 1094.5 (see Gov. Code, § 19750 et seq.),
and the writ of mandamus will therefore 1ie to review the
board's decision. [4] Since the jurisdiction of the State Per-

638

BOREN

v.

STATE PERSONNEL BOARD

[37 C.2d

sonnel Board, including its adjudicating po\ver, is derivlld
directly from the Constitution (art. XXIV, § 3a j cf. Oovl"rt
v. State Board of Equalization, 29 Ca1.2d 125, 131-132 [173
P.2d 545]), the writ of certiorari is also available to review
the board's decisions. (O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal.App.2d 449,
453-457,460 [109 P.2d 8]; Code Ci.... Proc., §§ 1068, 1074.)
[5] As against a general demurrer, however, it is unimportant that plaintiff's pleading was not in form a petition
for mandamus or certiorari. All that is required is that plaintiff state facts entitling him to some type of relief, and if a
cause of action for mandamus or certiorari has been stated,
the general demurrer should have been overruled. (Grain v.
Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514, 520 r 99 Am.Dec. 423] : Brown v. Anderson-Oottonwood Irr. Dis!., 183 Cal. 186, 188 [190 P. 797);
Estate of Brown, 196 Cal. 114, 125-126 [236 P. 1441; In re.
01'iy and Oounty of San Francisco. 195 Cal. 426, 429 [233
P. 965); In re Oaliform:a Toll Bridge A.1dhority, 2]2 Cal.
298, 309 [298 P. 485] ; Board of Trustees v. State.- Board of
EquaUzation, 1 Ca1.2d 784, 787 [37 P.2d 84. 96 A.L.R. 775) :
Traders Oredit Oorp. v. Superior Oourt, 111 Cal.App. 663. 667
[296 P. 99] ; Husband v. Superior Court, 128 Cal.App. 444,
448 [17 P.2d 764); Code Civ. Proc., §§ 452,580,1109.)
Even if the second amended complaint is regarded as a
petition for a writ of mandamus or certiorari, it fails to allege
any facts that would justify granting the relief sought.
Review of an administrative order by means of mandamus-.
is governed by section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which provides: ". . . (b) The inquiry in such a case shall
extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded
without or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fail'
trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of dis..
cretion. Abuse of discretion is established if the respondent.
has not proceeded in the manner required by law, the order
or decision is not support~d by the findings, or the finding'F.
are not supported by the evinence."
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that establish any lack
or excess of jurisdiction. [6] Sections 2(c), 3(a), and 5(a)
of article XXIV of the Constitution vest the State Personnel
Board with jurisdiction over all dismissals, demotions, and
suspensions in the state civil service. (See"also, Gov. Code,
§ 19570 et seq.) The order dismissing plaintiff from his civil
service position was therefore within the jurisdiction of the
board.
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With respect to the rClluir(!ment that he be accorded a fair
trial, plaintiff contends that the State Persollnel Board was a
party to his contract of employment and is therefore unable
to render an unprejudiced decision concerning it. [7] The
vl~ry nature of a contract with the state, however, makes
impossible an interpretation or enforcement of it that is, in
the strictest sense, ., disinterested' '-some officer,. agency, or
court of the state itself must ultimately decide what are the
state's rights and obligations. Protection to those who deal
with the state is provided, not by referring controversies to
third parties, but by electing and appointing conscientious
officials and judges. To obtain responsible control over state
employment the civil service system was established by the
people. (Const., art XXIV.) The power to discipline employees was largely transferred from various officials and
departments to the State Personnel Board. It was contemplated, furthermore, tllat civil service should be under the
board's supervision, to the end that an personnel matters
be expertly and uniformly administered. [8] There is no unfairness, therefore, in the fact that plaintiff's rights have
been decided in the first instance by the same public agency
with which he dealt lit the time of his appointment. The
position of the State Personnel Board in this respect is not
unlike that of the Board of Medical Examiners and other
licensing agencies that supervise the granting of licenses, the
scope of the activities permitted thereunder, and, when nE'CE'S8ary, the disciplining of licensees. (See Dare· v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 21 Cal.2d 790 [136 P.2d 304]; Webster
v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Ca1.2d 534 [110 P.2d 992] :
Covert v. State Board of EqualizaNon, 29 Ca1.2d 125[173
P.2d 545]; O'Brien v. Olson, 42 Cal.App.2d 449 [l09 P.2d
8].) [9] Moreover, state employment is accepted subject to
statutory provisions regulating such matters as salary, working conditions. and tenure (Oaliform'a v. Broth.erhood of
Railroad Trainmen, ante, pp. 412, 417 [232 P.2d 857]:
Risley v. Board of Oim, Service Oommrs., 60 Cal.App.2d 32,
36-39 [140 P.2d 167]), and plaintiff is presumed to have
known when he joined the civil senice that the State Personnel Board is charged by Jaw with deciding all questions
of dismissal. (Const .. art XXTV: Gov. Code. § 19570 et seq.)
[10] The State Personnel Board was therefore a proper
tribunal, and, since there iR no claim that any member of the
board was prejudiced against plaintiff, it must be concluded
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that he has failed to allege facts that would establish the
denial of a fair trial.
Although the complaint does not expressly allege an abuse
of discretion within the meaning of section 1094.5, plaintiff'.
principal contention is to that effect.
It is alleged, in substance, that by reason of the representations of the State Personnel Board and the terms of plaintiff's
acceptance of the offer of employment, it was a condition of
his contract that he would not be required to serve outside
the Southern California area; that he was ordered by his
superior to report for duty at Sacramento, which is not in
Southern California; that he refused to obey this order on
the ground that it was contrary to his contract; that the
charges before the State Personnel Board were based on this
refusal; that his answer to the charges set up this condition
of his contract; that the State Personnel Board "made no
findings as to the location at which plaintiff had been appointed
to serve, or as to the condition upon which he had accepted
appointment to his position, . . . and said State Personnel
Board declined to attach any significance to the conditional
nature of plaintiff's employment; and said board entirely
ignored plaintiff's defense that his contract of employment._
. . . justified his failure to obey the order of his superior to
report for duty at Sacramento."
[11] Under certain conditions, the failure of the board to .
consider a proper defense set up by the party charged or
to make findings thereon might constitute a failure to proceed
"in the manner required by law" and therefore an abuse
of discretion under section 1094.5. (See Gov. Code, §§ 19578,
19582; cf. Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal.2d
534,543 [110 P.2d 992J.) [12a] In this case, however, even had
the board made findings in accord with plaintiff's allegations
of fact, such findings would not support the conclusion that
his employment was conditional in nature and that the condition justified his refusal to report for duty at Sacramento.
[13,14] It is true that a demurrer assumes the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint, and it is also true that a
contract may ordinarily be pleaded by its legal effect. Implicit in plaintiff's allegations, however, is the claim that the
State Personnel Board had authority to promise on behalf
of the state that plaintiff would not be required to serve elsewhere than in Southern California. [15] Since the board's
authority is governed by the Constitution and by the Civil
Service Act (Gov. Code, § 18500 et seq.), both of which are the
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subject to judicial notice (Code Civ. Proc., § 1875 (2), (3»,
the scope of that authority is a question of law and may
properly be considered on demurrer. (Branham v. The Mayor
etc. of San Jose, 24 Cal. 585, 602; see, also, Ohm v. San Francisco, 92 Cal. 437, 449-450 [28 P. 580] ; Callahan v. Broderick,
124 Cal. 80, 83 [56 P. 782].)
[16] The terms and conditions of civil service employment
are fixed by statute and not by contract. (California v.
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, ante, pp. 412, 41'1
[232 P.2d 857] ; Risley v. Board of Civil Service Commr,.,
60 Cal.App.2d 32, 36 [140 P.2d 167]; Nutter v. City of Santa
Monica, 74 Cal.App.2d 292, 298 [168 P.2d 741] ; City of Lo,
Angeles v. Lo, Angeles etc. Council, 94 Cal.App.2d36, 44
[210 P.2d 305]; see Neuwald v. Brock, 12 Cal.2d 662, 668
[86 P.2d 1047]; 14 Cal.L.Rev. 326.) "When an employee
of the state, under civil service, accepts a position, he
does so with knowledge of the fact that his salary, and, indeed,
his conduct, are both subject to the law governing such
matters, as set forth in the statute and the rules and regulations of the commission." (Raymond v. Christian, 24 Cal.
.App.2d 92, 100 [74 P.2d 536] ; see, also, Stephens v. Clark,
16 Cal.2d 490, 493 [106 P·.2d 874].) [17] The statutory provisiQns controlling the terinS and conditions of civil service
employment cannot be circumvented by purported contracts
in codict therewith. It is therefore unnecessary to determine
whether the postal card questionnaire filled out by plaintiff
when he applied for state employment set forth the conditions
of a contract, as he contends, or was merely a request for
information, as defendants contend. The controlling question
is whether the statutory provisions governing employment in
the state civil service gave to plaintiff's superior the authority
to transfer him from Los Angeles to Sacramento.
Section 19360 of the Government Code provides: U An
appointing power may at any time transfer any employee
under his jurisdiction from one position to another in the
same class or in another class having substantially similar
duties, responsibilities, and qualifications, and substantially
the same salary range. In every such case the appointing
power shall give written notice of his action to the board, according to board rule."
[18] Plaintiff contends that this section does not authorize
the transfer of an employee, over his objection, to 8 place not
contemplated in the contract of employment and that the
IJ'I C.Jd-.ll
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word "position" in the section refers to the kind of work
and not to a geographical position or place. Even if it is
conceded that "position" is equivalent to employment for
particular work, no geographical limitation is placed upon
the broad power granted to transfer an employee from one
job in the state to another. (See Spaletta v. Kelly, 30 Cal.
App.2d 656, 659-660 [86 P.2d 1074J; cf. Mitchell v. Board
of Trustees of Visalia Union High School Dist., 5 Cal.App.2d
64, 69 [42 P.2d 397].) Had the Legislature intended such a
limitation, it could easily have been provided for, just as
limitations as to duties, responsibilities, qualifications, and
salary range were provided for. Moreover, the statute expressly applies to any employee and makes no exception of
employees claiming under special contracts such as that alleged here.
The conclusion that section 19360 granted to plaintiff's
superior the authority to transfer him to Sacramento is reinforced by the interpretation that the }legislature itself
has given the statute. The section immediately following
(§ 19361) provides: "If a transfer is protested to the board
by an employee as made for the purpose of harassing or disciplining him, the appointing power may require the employee
to transfer pending approval or disapproval of the transfer
by the board. If the board disapproves the transfer, the employee shall be returned to his former position, shall be paid
the regular travel allowance for the period of time he was
away from his original headquarters, and his moving costs both
from and back to the original headquarters shall be paid in
accordance with Board of Control rules." "[A] transfer"
in section 19361 obviously refers to a transfer pursuant to
section 19360, and section 19361 clearly recognizes that such
a transfer may involve a cbange from one geographical location to another. Further evidence of tbe Legislature's purpose may be found in section 18006 of the Government Code
(formerly Pol. Code, § 352.5) ; that statute provides: "Whenever a state officer, agent or employee is required by the appointing power to change bis place of residence necessitating
tbe moving of his household effects, such officer, agent or employee shall receive his actual moving expenses not to exceed
four hundred dollars ($400), and the Board of Control may
adopt general rules and regulations covering the payment of
such ~:xpenses." The implication is obvious that a geographical transfer may be required.
It should be observed that tbere is no allegation by plain-
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tifT that thc order that he report for duty at Sacramento was
made to harass or discipline him. The present case is therefore to be distinguished from the recent decision of this court
in Buckman v. Board of Supervisors, ante, pp. 305, 307 l231
P.2d 496].
Plaintiff contends that even if the State Personnel Board
was without authority to make a contract limiting the geographical area of plaintiff's service, the state is nevertheless
estopped by the board's representations. To involte estoppel in
cases like the present would have the effect of granting to the
state's agents the power to bind the state merely by repre·
senting that they have the power to do so. [19] It is accordingly held that the authority of a public officer cannot be expanded by estoppel. (County of San Diego v. California
Water etc. Co., 30 Ca1.2d 817,825.830 {186 P.2d 124] ; Wheeler
v. City of Santa Ana, 81 Cal.App.2d 811,817 [185 P.2d 373J;
Branham v. The Mayor etc. of San Jose, 24 Cal. 585, 604;
Raisch v. City and County of San P"ancisco, 80 Cal. 1, 6 {22
P. 22] ; Gardella v. County of Amador, 164 Cal. 555, 564 [129
P. 993] ; Foxen v. City of Santa Barbara, 166 Cal. 77, 81-83
{134 P. 1142] ; Von Schmidt v. Widber, 105 Cal. 151, 157 {38
P. 682] ; Sacramento etc. Dist. v. Rt1ey, 194 Cal. 624, 638 [229
P. 95~] ; see, also, 10 Cal.Jur. § 28, p. 652; 7 A.L.R. 1248, 1249;
cf. Lukens v. Nye, 156 Cal. 498, 505-506 [105 P. 593]; City
of Arcata v. Green, 156 Cal. 759-764-765 (106 P. 86].)
[20] Even in the field of private contracts, the doctrines of
ostensible agency or agency by estoppel are not based upon the
representations of the agent but upon the representations of
the principal. (Ernst v. Searle, 218 Cal. 233, 237 [22 P.2d
715] ; Hill v. Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank, 9 Ca1.2d
172,176 [69 P.2d 853] ; Civ. Code, § 2317; see, also, Hobart v.
Hobart Estate Co., 26 Ca1.2d 412, 452 [159 P.2d 958] ; Pacific
Ready-Cut Homes v. Seeber, 205 Cal. 690, 694 [272 P. 579] ;
Hams v. San Diego Flume Co., 87 Cal. 526, 528 [25 P. 758] ;
1 Cal.Jur. §§ 33-45, pp. 731-747 [especially §§ 39, 41].)
[12b] Here the state, as principal, did not represent that the
board could limit plaintiff's service to Southern California,
but on the contrary enacted and published section 19360 of
the Government Code, which gives the power of transfer to
plaintiff's superior.
It must be concluded that no abuse of discretion is indicated
by the 'allegation that the board ignored plaintiff's claimed
contractual defense and made no findings thereon. [21] Moreover, the complaint states that the board did make find·
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ings, although they are not set forth, even in substance. Under these circumstances, it must be assumed, in the absence
of a contrary allegation, that the decision is supported by the
findings and that the findings are supported by the evidence.
[22] Having failed to bring his allegations within the
provisions of section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action for relief by writ
of mandamus. [23] Inasmuch as the scope of review by certiorari is at least as limited as that by mandamus (see Code
Civ. Proc., § 1074), it follows that plaintiff has likewise failed
to state a cause of action in certiorari.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter. J., Schauer,

J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied September
7,1951.
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